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Last month, when I accepted the invitation to speak today I may have been 
channeling Sir Wilfred Jenks.  Jenks famously invoked Proverbs 29:18 in arguing for 
idealism in international law -- “where there is no vision, people perish”, he insisted.1  
When I heard that my assignment for today was to consider whether there is a role for the 
sort non-state posse comitatus enforcement of international law envisioned by Paul Watson 
and Sea Shepherd, I suspect I may have been subconsciously thinking, “where there is no 
vision, whales perish”.   It will become apparent that much vision is required here because 
the law is not favourable to Watson. 
 
I. THE CLAIM TO NON-STATE ENFORCEMENT AND ITS REJECTION 
 
I first saw the case for the legality of Sea Shepherd enforcement of international 
law raised in a 2007 profile article about Watson I read in the New Yorker.2  The article 
recounted that: 
 
[i]n the early nineties, . . .  Watson began to assert legal authority for his actions [in 
sinking and harassing whalers]. For this, he cited primarily the . . . World Charter 
for Nature, . . . which [according to Watson] allows for private citizens to [enforce 
law to] “safeguard and conserve nature in areas beyond national jurisdiction.”3
 
The same claim can still be found on the Sea Shepherd website today.4  In addition, 
Watson claims he is exercising a right of “citizen’s arrest” because of the failure of states 
to stop illegal whaling by Japan.   
 
                                                 
1 C. Wilfred Jenks, Idealism in International Law, in ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 39 (M.K. Nawaz, ed., 
1976). 
 
2 Raffi Khatchadourian, Neptune’s Navy, The New Yorker, Nov. 5, 2007, p 56. 
 
3 Id, p 66.  This is a quote from paragraph 21(e) of the World Charter for Nature, which says absolute nothing 
about enforcement, much less empowering enforcement by non-state actors.  To me the strongest provisions 
that might, but do not, support Watson and Sea Shepard are paras. 21(c) and 24.   
 
4  See http://www.seashepherd.org/whales/
 
If you are an international lawyer, you may understandably reject these claims out 
of hand.  For instance, my colleague, Don Rothwell, was quoted in The Australian in 
January as saying an attempt by Sea Shepherd to make a citizen’s arrest on the high seas is 
“completely nonsense, it has no basis [in] international law . . .”.5   Natalie Klein too has 
rejected Watson’s claims.  As she wrote in her February op/ed piece in the Australian: 
 
What is clear, legally, is that Sea Shepherd does not have policing powers. . . .  Sea 
Shepherd members are not entitled to conduct what is known as a right of visit to 
deliver protest letters . . . or for a citizen’s arrest.6
 
Likewise, the author of the New Yorker article wrote that when he: 
 
described Watson’s use of the [WCN] to David Caron, the co-director of the Law 
of the Sea Institute, at the University of California at Berkeley, [Caron merely] 
said, “Clearly wrong. There is no ambiguity.”7
 
II. JUSTIFYING PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
 
Given these pronouncements, can the so-called enforcement actions of Watson and 
Sea Shepherd be justified? 
 
A. Law reform proposals 
 
Well, we might begin by looking at proposals that have been put in favour of 
enforcement by non-state actors.  For instance, Chris Stone has long advocated for a 
system of environmental guardianship, in which non-state actors would be designated as 
conservators to serve as the legal voice for non-humans, including whales, and endowed 
with standing to initiate legal action on their behalf.8  Even earlier (1969), four Nordic 
U.N. Associations came together and declared that each individual has a right to live in a 
clean environment and ought to, on this account, have the right to enforce agreements for 
limiting pollution.9  In the event these proposals became law, Watson and Sea Shepherd 
would be in a much stronger position, but their ability to physically restrain and arrest to 
enforce law would still be doubtful.  
                                                 
5 Peter Alford & Debbie Guest, Japanese Spout Whale Hunting, The Australian, Jan. 12, 2010, available at: 
http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/japanese-spout-whale-hunting/story-e6frg6n6-1225818218764
 
6 Natalie Klein, Whaling Protesters are Behaving Like Pirates, The Australia, February 18, 2010, available at: 
http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/opinion/whaling-protesters-are-behaving-like-pirates/story-e6frg6zo-
1225831542623
 
7 Raffi Khatchadourian, Neptune’s Navy, The New Yorker, Nov. 5, 2007, at 66. 
 
8 Christopher D. Stone, EARTH AND OTHER ETHICS: THE CASE FOR MORAL PLURALISM 45-48 (1987) 
 
9 Lynton Caldwell, IN DEFENSE OF EARTH: INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF THE BIOSPHERE 122-23 (1972) 
 
 
 
 
B. Policy considerations 
 
Beyond these proposals, on a policy level, I admit there is, for me, a sort of 
attraction to the possibility of private enforcement in the international legal system, where 
enforcement of any sort remains deficient.  To study Pollack and Maitland’s romantic 
account of ancient outlawry in England is to see some reason for private enforcement 
where the power of a central legal authority is weak.  In 11th and 12th Century England 
royal courts were still largely ineffectual criminal law enforcers.  As a result outlawry 
developed and made “it every ones’s duty to capture” the outlaw.10  The related process of 
hue and cry facilitated the capture.  Pollack and Maitland explain that “when a felony is 
committed, the hue and cry should be raised” and “neighbours should turn out” with 
“bows, arrows and knives” in order to capture the felon.11  By the 13th Century royal 
judges are increasing their control, but the role of the private person in the apprehension of 
alleged criminals is retained and remains to this day.  It ultimately becomes defined by the 
law of citizen’s arrest, to which we will return in a bit. 
 
The point I want to make here, though, is that the need to maintain peace and 
security within a community for the common good – a first object of all legal systems – 
may open legitimate opportunities for individual enforcement when official means to 
coerce obedience are anemic.    
 
However, the international legal context raises, in my view, insurmountable 
difficulties for this sort of private non-state enforcement.  Despite its initial attraction as 
municipal law analogue, it is almost certainly unworkable at international law. First of all, 
clear chaos would follow the allowance of the sort of private enforcement envisioned by 
Watson and Sea Shepherd, especially in a legal system where it is difficult to obtain 
authoritative determinations of violations of international law.  Permitting the private 
enforcement of law in the international legal system would mean allowing non-state actors 
to make their own assessments about legality and allowing private violence by those with 
the will and means to exercise it.  It exacerbates the likelihood of violence, instead of 
reducing it because it is likely to be met with counterforce.  Additionally, most violations 
in the international legal system arise because a state itself breaches an international 
obligation.  Affecting some sort of “citizen’s arrest” of the state construct (or its 
instrumentalities and officers) is virtually impossible outside of international criminal law 
because of barriers presented by sovereignty, immunity, jurisdiction and so forth.   
 
 
 
                                                 
10 Frederick Pollack and Frederic W. Maitland, 1 The History of English Law, 477 (2d ed., 1898) 
 
11 Id. vol. 2 at 578-79. 
III. APPLYING RELEVANT INTERNATIONAL LAW 
 
We might end our enquiry here on the policy considerations against private 
enforcement, but what about the law?  Does either international law or the Australian 
implementation of international law support enforcement claims by Watson and Sea 
Shepherd?  
 
Looking at international law first, Watson has at least one person in his legal 
corner.  A few weeks ago I was provided a copy of a student article, recently published in 
the Villanova Environmental Law Journal, making the case for Watson.12  Hardly a 
counter-weight to Don, Natelie and David Caron, I know, but I thought it might provide 
some “vision.”  Unfortunately, it does not.   
 
The crux of the piece, cites the World Charter for Nature, the Australian case of  
Humane Society International v. Kyodo Senpaku Kaisha Ltd, and unspecified articles of 
UNCLOS, as somehow combining to “give[] Paul Watson and Sea Shepherd enough 
authority to act on behalf of and enforce” what the article calls “international conservation 
law” in “neutral coastal waters” -- a reference to a humanitarian law concept misused to 
mean “areas beyond national jurisdiction.” The article also states that “the recent 
Australian decision in Humane Society and the increased public ire of the global 
community over Japan’s whaling, together, lend increased weight to Sea Shepherd’s 
authority”. You might wonder how a General Assembly Resolution, a single Australian 
Federal Court decision, and an irked global public can combine to confer legal authority on 
Sea Shepherd. I am still wondering. 
 
Obviously, making the case for Sea Shepherd requires clearing a number of large 
hurdles, but none is perhaps bigger than first identifying at least one international legal 
norm, binding on Japan as the relevant flag state, that has been breached by the Japanese 
whalers in the Southern Ocean.  The strongest arguments, perhaps, have been detailed in 
legal opinions by the Sydney Panel of Independent Experts.  As the Chair of the Panel 
summerised, “[a]t the core of these legal opinions [is] that Japan’s interpretation of the 
1946 [Whaling Convention] allowing for ‘special permit’ scientific research whaling [is] 
an abuse of right and inconsistent with Article 8 of the Convention.”13  Recently, the re-
branded Canberra Panel opined that the legality of Japanese Whaling might be challenged 
as a violation of the Madrid Protocol’s requirements on environmental impact 
assessment.14   
                                                 
12 JE Roeschke, Eco-terrorism and Piracy on the High Seas: Japanese Whaling and the Rights of Private 
Groups to Enforce International, XX VILLANOVA ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL 99 (2009) 
 
13 Jurist Website http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/forumy/2010/03/japanese-whaling-when-diplomacy-fails.php.  See 
also Dylan A. MacLeod, International Consequences of Norway's Decision to Allow the Resumption of 
Limited Commercial Whaling,  Dalhousie Law Journal, Vol. 17, Issue 1 (Spring 1994),  83, 100.   
 
14 See http://www.ifaw.org/assets/Media_Center/Press_Releases/asset_upload_file545_51771.pdf   
 
 
No authoritative determination by an international tribunal has confirmed these 
claims.  But let’s assume that the Experts are right and Japan is abusing its rights under the 
ICRW and has breached the Madrid Protocol.  In these circumstances, can Watson and Sea 
Shepherd act to physically stop these international law violations?  In order to answer this 
question we need to distinguish between whaling taking place on the high seas and 
whaling taking place in the EEZ Australia has proclaimed adjacent to the Australian 
Antarctic Territory. 
 
A. High Seas Enforcement 
 
Turning to the high seas first, let us consider Watson’s enforcement claims in their 
strongest possible light by treating Sea Shepherd as if it were a state.  If a state is not 
permitted to enforce by seizure and arrest, then absent some form of consent by states, Sea 
Shepherd will not possess enforcement power.  In this posture our starting position should 
be that enforcement is permissible unless a positive rule of international law otherwise 
establishes a prohibition.  This takes us immediately to the United Nations Convention on 
the Law of the Sea and positive rules of prohibition.   
 
 1. UNCLOS 
 
Because the high seas are involved, Part VII of the Convention comes into play. 
The analysis is simple and straight forward. Under Article 92, all ships are subject to the 
exclusive jurisdiction of the flag state on the high seas.  Absent exception, no other state, 
can exercise enforcement jurisdiction. Under Article 110, only a warship may exercise the 
right of visit on the high seas in five narrow situations – none of which are relevant here.15  
Under Articles 105 and 107, it is only in the case of piracy that a ship may be seized and 
persons on board arrested; and it is only a warship or ships clearly indentified as being in 
government service that can seize a ship for piracy.  Of course, Japan’s whaling does not 
fall within the definition of piracy under Article 101.16  Accordingly, no state (much less 
Sea Shepherd) has the power to seize and arrest Japanese Whalers on the high Seas in the 
Southern Ocean.   
 
This means that Watson and Sea Shepherd must point to a rule of international law 
that explicitly authorizes private enforcement.17 To do this Watson points to the World 
Charter for Nature. 
 
 
                                                 
15 Visit is possible where there are reasonable grounds to suspect piracy, slave trade, unauthorized 
broadcasting, or that the ship may not have a nationality or is of the same nationality as the warship. 
 
16 But see some of the claims in the turbo dispute between Canada and Spain in the Estai case. 
 
17 H. Lauterpacht, The Subjects of the Law of Nations, 63 LAW QUARTERLY REV. 438, 439 (1947). 
 
 2. WCN 
 
Reliance on the Charter is quickly dispatched.  Nothing in it authorizes the actions 
of Watson and Sea Shepherd.  The WCN is a Resolution of the U.N. General Assembly. 
And, while it was adopted with a near universal majority, it is not legally binding and 
states have not treated it as such.  It is couched in precatory generalities, which belie any 
sort of fundamental norm creating character.  Indeed, the travaux indicates the drafters 
were of the view that “by its very nature, the Charter [can]not have any binding force, nor 
have any regime of sanctions attached to it”.18
 
But even if the WCN was possessed of legal normativity of the hardest variety, 
nothing in it confers authority on non-state actors to enforce international law in the self-
help, physical way asserted by Watson and Sea Shepherd.   At most the WCN recognizes 
that “each person shall strive to ensure that the objectives and requirements of the present 
Charter are met.” This striving is, of course, subject to lawful avenues of action.  One 
cannot bootstrap private enforcement to this striving if it cannot be located elsewhere in the 
law. 
 
 3. Citizen’s arrest as a general principle of law 
 
The only other source of authority that I have been able to think of is the possibility 
that the “citizen’s arrest” might be a “general principle of law recognized by civilized 
nations” a la Art. 38(1)(c) of the ICJ Statute.  The International Court of Justice has 
periodically recognized normative procedures as general principles of law when they are 
widely reflected across the world’s principal legal systems.19 A citizen’s arrest is a 
criminal process which allows private persons to apprehend and detain a suspect of a crime 
in defined circumstances.20  A very cursory and preliminary search of municipal legal 
systems demonstrates that citizen’s arrest is provided for in the laws of at least 21 
countries, including Australia, the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, France, 
Brazil, India, Pakistan, Malaysia, Hong Kong, and Mexico.  It is true that great caution 
needs to be exercised when transposing a widely recognized municipal law procedure 
(assuming citizen’s arrest is) into the international legal system because of their different 
natures, but with more research a citizen’s arrest might qualify as such a normative 
procedure. 
 
Of course, I should stress here that the attendant difficulties of private enforcement 
in the international system that I’ve related already will militate against finding citizen’s 
arrest to be a general principle outside of the municipal law context. 
                                                 
18 Report of the Ad hoc Group Meeting on the Draft World Charter for Nature, U.N. Doc. A/539 (1981). 
 
19 See e.g., Jonathan I. Charney, Is International Law Threatened by Multiple Tribunals? 271 Rec. des Cours 
101, 115, 190, 196, 200-10 (1998). 
 
20 See generally Comment, The Law of Citizen’s Arrest, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 502 (1965) 
 
B.  EEZ Enforcement 
 
Be that as it may, if we now assume that the Japanese Whaling being challenged is 
taking place within the EEZ Australia has proclaimed in Antarctica, we need to consider 
Part V of UNCLOS in assessing the enforcement claims.   We quickly find that nothing in 
Part V empowers non-state actors to take enforcement action in the EEZ.  But that does not 
yet end the matter because we also need to consider whether Watson and Sea Shepherd 
have enforcement authority under Australian law. 
 
IV. ACTION UNDER AUSTRALIAN IMPLEMENTATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
 
 In my view, the Australian proclamation of an Antarctic EEZ presents Watson and 
Sea Shepherd with their strongest opportunity to claim private enforcement powers – 
despite the difficult international legal and political ramifications that would surely follow.  
 
On July 26, 1994, Australia proclaimed an EEZ adjacent to its territorial claim in 
Antarctica. In 1999, the Commonwealth Parliament enacted the Environmental Protection 
and Biodiversity Conseration Act 1999 (Cth)(EPBC Act).  The Australian Whale Sanctuary 
(AWS) is established under section 225 of the Act.  By virtue of sections 5(1), 5(4), and 
5(5) of the EPBC Act, section 8 of the Australian Antarctic Territory Act 1954 (Cth), 
section 10 of the Seas and Submerged Lands Act 1973 (Cth) and the 1994 Proclamation,21 
the Australian Whale Sanctuary applies to the EEZ in Antarctica.    
 
Under the EPBC Act it is an offence to kill, injure, take, interfere with, treat or 
possess whales, without an Australian permit, within the AWS.22  The offence provisions 
expressly apply to both Australian nationals and non-nationals (ie Japanese Whalers) 
within the AWS.23  Under sections 229, 229B, 229D, 230, killing, treating and possessing 
whales are offences punishable by up to two years in prison (and a fine not exceeding 1000 
penalty units). 
 
On January 15, 2008, in the case of HSI v. Kyodo, the Federal Court of Australia 
issued declaratory relief and issued an injunction against Kyodo for operating in the 
Antarctic AWS.  The court declared that Kyodo had breached sections 229—232 and 238 
of the EPBC Act by killing, treating and possessing whales in the Australia Antarctic 
                                                 
21 Seas and Submerged Lands Act 1973 Proclamation, COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA GAZETTE (SPECIAL), 
No. S 290, Friday, 29 July 1994 (1994). 
 
22 Under section 7 of the EPBC Act, Chapter 2 of the Criminal Code (Cth), with the exception of Part 2.5, 
applies to all offences against the Act. 
 
23 EPBC Act, ss 224(2) and 5(3). 
 
Whale Sanctuary.24  The judgment, however, remains unenforced by the Federal 
government to this day. 
 
If Japanese whaling continues in Australia’s Antarctic EEZ, Watson and Sea 
Shepherd’s strongest enforcement arguments arise under section 3Z of the Commonwealth 
Crimes Act 1914.  Section 3Z provides: 
(1)  A person who is not a constable may, without warrant, arrest another person if 
he or she believes on reasonable grounds that: 
                 (a)  the other person is committing or has just committed an indictable offence; 
and 
(b) proceedings by summons against the other person would not achieve [a 
number of things, the most relevant being, either:  
                              (i)  the appearance of the person before a court in respect of the 
offence; or 
                             (ii)  preventing a repetition or continuation of the offence . . .; 
                            
There are five points to note about section 3Z.   
 
First, it appears that “any person” who is not a constable may make a citizen’s 
arrest.  Nationality does not appear to be a restriction.  
 
Second, s.3Z applies in Australia’s EEZ by virtue of s3A of the Crimes Act.  See R 
v. Disun, 2003 WASCA 47 (7 Feb). 
 
Third, a Commonwealth indictable offence is defined under Crimes Act section 4G 
as an offence that is punishable by imprisonment for a period exceeding 12 months.  
Clearly a number of EPBC whaling offences are indictable offences.  They are punishable 
by imprisonment for up to 24 months. 
 
Fourth, as the Kyodo case demonstrates, it seems certain that proceedings by 
summons against Japanese Whalers will neither prevent a repetition of the offence nor 
result in an appearance in court for trial.  
 
Fifth, provided Watson and Sea Shepherd deliver any person arrested or property 
seized to a constable as soon as practicable after the arrest, such an arrest appears lawful 
under Commonwealth law. 
 
Accordingly, Watson and Sea Shepherd seem to have a legitimate avenue to 
exercise citizen’s arrest under Australian law, despite the fact that Japan will vociferously 
protest this assertion of Australian jurisdiction.   
                                                 
24 Humane Society International Inc v Kyodo Senpaku Kaisha Ltd, [2008] FCA 3 (15 January 2008).  
 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
 
 If you were a lawyer advising Watson and Sea Shepherd, your first point of counsel 
might be to explain that their reliance on international law as authority to “enforce” 
perceived breaches by Japanese whalers in the Southern Ocean is misplaced. No such 
authority exists and Sea Shepherds harassment and boarding actions on the high seas 
contravene international law. Moreover, as Natalie Klein suggested, you would point out 
that it is good policy to obey the law yourself, if you want others to do the same. 
Secondly, you might highlight that the situation changes in the Antarctic EEZ 
claimed by Australia off the Australian Antarctic Territory.  It would be important to 
highlight that the vast majority of the world has not recognized the claim, but under 
Australian law, a right to citizen’s arrest for indictable offences under the EPBC Act is 
available.  You might highlight that the HSI v. Kyodo case confirms the offences, but that 
the Commonwealth government has not yet moved to enforce the decision.  While a 
citizen’s arrest by Watson and Sea Shepherd might not prompt a Commonwealth 
prosecution, it would serve to highlight the unsatisfactory state of affairs with respect to 
Australian legal action and bring more pressure to bear on achieving a resolution of the 
intractable impasse in the International Whaling Commission. 
 
 
